Legacy Nodes and RISC‑V as a Pathway to Silicon Sovereignty for the European Union

Abstract

The European Union’s pursuit of semiconductor sovereignty is shaped by structural dependencies on non‑European manufacturing and by the accelerating strategic importance of hardware‑rooted trust. Recent work on Engram Signature (Ecker‑Fils, 2026) has proposed a substrate‑level framework for identity and provenance in digital systems, suggesting that long‑term autonomy may depend on embedding trust mechanisms directly into silicon rather than relying solely on software‑layer protocols. This framework also raises the possibility of Engram Bias: systematic distortions that emerge when identity, attestation, or provenance mechanisms are anchored in hardware controlled by external actors. Although Engram Signature and Engram Bias remain provisional and open to falsification, they highlight a broader strategic concern: sovereignty in digital infrastructures requires control over the hardware substrate itself. This paper argues that legacy‑node manufacturing (14–28 nm) combined with open RISC‑V architectures offers a realistic pathway for the European Union to mitigate such risks. By enabling domestically governed identity primitives, reducing platform dependency, and supporting long‑lifecycle critical systems, this approach provides a viable foundation for European silicon sovereignty without requiring leading‑edge semiconductor nodes.


1. Introduction

The European Union’s semiconductor dependency has become a central strategic concern in recent years. Advanced manufacturing capacity remains concentrated in Taiwan and South Korea, while the United States has consolidated its position through the CHIPS and Science Act and a series of export‑control measures that shape global supply chains. Europe, despite possessing world‑leading lithography suppliers and a strong research base, lacks domestic leading‑edge fabs and faces long timelines and high capital requirements to build them. This structural gap has intensified debates about technological autonomy, industrial resilience, and the long‑term security of critical infrastructure.

This paper does not argue that Europe should abandon efforts to develop advanced manufacturing. The European Chips Act, national industrial strategies in Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, and partnerships with global foundries reflect a deliberate attempt to rebuild parts of the semiconductor value chain. These initiatives serve political and economic purposes beyond technological catch‑up: they signal long‑term commitment, reduce strategic vulnerability, and maintain bargaining power in transatlantic and global negotiations. Moreover, the EU’s pursuit of sovereignty is not a zero‑sum project. European policymakers continue to emphasize cooperation with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, even as they seek to reduce structural dependencies and strengthen internal resilience.

At the same time, recent research has highlighted that identity, trust, and provenance in digital systems increasingly depend on substrate‑level mechanisms rather than purely software‑defined constructs. In Engram Signature: Substrate‑Rooted Identity in AI Systems (Aure Ecker‑Fils, 2026, DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19185.54887), the concept of Engram Signature was introduced as a theoretical framework for understanding how identity can be anchored in hardware‑rooted operations rather than higher‑level protocols. The framework remains provisional and open to falsification, but early indicators suggest that substrate‑rooted identity may become increasingly relevant for long‑lifecycle systems, secure infrastructure, and AI governance. While the present paper does not depend on the validity of the Engram framework, it draws on its central intuition: that sovereignty in digital systems ultimately requires control over the hardware substrate.

This perspective motivates the core argument of this paper: that legacy‑node manufacturing (14–28 nm) combined with open RISC‑V architectures offers a realistic, strategically coherent pathway for the European Union to establish silicon sovereignty without relying on leading‑edge semiconductor nodes. This approach aligns with Europe’s industrial strengths, reduces platform dependency, and enables hardware‑rooted identity and security mechanisms that support long‑term autonomy. The remainder of the paper situates this argument within the broader context of technological autonomy, strategic industrial policy, and critical infrastructure security.


2. The Global Semiconductor Sovereignty Landscape

2.1 Concentration of Leading‑Edge Manufacturing

- Advanced nodes (5 nm, 3 nm) remain concentrated in Taiwan and South Korea.  
- Europe lacks domestic operators with experience at these nodes.  
- Construction timelines for advanced fabs exceed five years, with uncertain economic viability.

2.2 Strategic Divergence Between the EU and the US

- The United States has adopted an assertive industrial and export‑control strategy.  
- Europe remains dependent on US‑controlled architectures and supply chains.  
- Recent geopolitical tensions have highlighted the fragility of transatlantic technological cooperation.  
- These dynamics increase the urgency of reducing structural dependencies.

2.3 Europe’s Structural Constraints

- High capital expenditure for leading‑edge fabs.  
- Fragmented demand across member states.  
- Limited domestic foundry operators capable of scaling advanced nodes.  
- Strong competition from US and Asian industrial ecosystems.


3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Technological Autonomy

- Defined as the ability to design, produce, and maintain key technologies without excessive external dependence.  
- Semiconductor autonomy is a prerequisite for digital sovereignty, defense capability, and economic resilience.

3.2 Strategic Industrial Policy

- Semiconductor manufacturing exhibits high fixed costs, long investment cycles, and strong geopolitical relevance.  
- Public investment and coordinated industrial strategy are necessary to shape long‑term capabilities.

3.3 Critical Infrastructure Security

- Trusted hardware is essential for energy systems, telecommunications, transportation, and digital identity.  
- Sovereignty requires control over the hardware roots of trust embedded in these systems.

3.4 Open Standards and Platform Dependency

- Proprietary architectures create vendor lock‑in and limit strategic flexibility.  
- Open standards reduce dependency and enable domestic innovation.  
- RISC‑V fits within this tradition of open, auditable technological platforms.


4. Why Legacy Nodes Matter for European Sovereignty

4.1 Legacy Nodes Are Sufficient for Strategic Workloads

- Identity, security, industrial control, automotive, and IoT systems do not require 3 nm performance.  
- Long‑lifecycle sectors prefer stability, reliability, and auditability over peak performance.

4.2 Lower Barriers to Entry

- Legacy nodes do not require EUV lithography.  
- Capital expenditure is significantly lower.  
- Europe already possesses industrial capacity at 14–28 nm.

4.3 Sovereignty Through “Good Enough” Silicon

- Sovereignty is defined by control, not by leading‑edge performance.  
- Legacy nodes enable Europe to produce secure, auditable chips for critical infrastructure.  
- This approach aligns with Europe’s industrial strengths and realistic timelines.


5. RISC‑V as a Sovereignty Enabler

5.1 Open ISA Advantages

- No licensing dependencies on US‑controlled architectures.  
- Full auditability of the instruction set.  
- Flexibility to design custom extensions for security and identity.  
- Alignment with European values of openness and transparency.

5.2 European Strengths in Open Hardware

- Strong academic research base.  
- Existing RISC‑V initiatives across multiple member states.  
- Compatibility with EU industrial policy goals.

5.3 Governance and Fragmentation Risks

- RISC‑V’s openness allows divergent extensions that may reduce interoperability.  
- Fragmentation complicates verification and long‑term maintainability.  
- Europe requires coordinated governance, shared profiles, and common verification frameworks.  
- An EU‑level RISC‑V governance body could ensure coherence across critical infrastructure deployments.

Here is a fully rewritten Section 5.4, integrating your Engram Signature concept and the hardware‑level extensions from the whitepaper — concise, academic, and directly aligned with the rest of the paper.


5.4 Hardware‑Rooted Identity Through Engram Signature

A sovereignty‑oriented semiconductor strategy requires identity and attestation mechanisms that do not depend on foreign architectures or opaque security modules. RISC‑V provides a unique opportunity for the European Union to embed such mechanisms directly into the hardware substrate. Recent work on Engram Signature has proposed a model in which identity, provenance, and trust are anchored in deterministic, substrate‑level operations rather than higher‑layer software protocols. This approach can be operationalized through lightweight RISC‑V extensions that implement Engram Signature primitives at the ISA level.

In practical terms, these extensions include minimal instructions for key derivation, signing, and attestation, executed within a protected Root‑of‑Trust environment. Key material remains isolated in hardware, while Engram‑structured claims can be constructed and signed directly by the processor. Because these extensions are small, auditable, and implementable on 14–28 nm nodes, they align with Europe’s existing manufacturing capabilities and long‑lifecycle industrial requirements.

Integrating Engram Signature operations into RISC‑V cores enables the EU to define its own identity substrate, independent of proprietary security architectures. It also mitigates the risk of Engram Bias — systematic distortions or dependencies that arise when identity mechanisms are controlled by external vendors or geopolitical actors. By standardizing these extensions across a coordinated European RISC‑V ecosystem, the EU can ensure that hardware‑rooted identity remains interoperable, verifiable, and governed by European institutions rather than external platforms.


6. A Realistic Pathway for the EU

6.1 Expand Legacy‑Node Manufacturing

- Prioritize 14–28 nm fabs across member states.  
- Leverage existing industrial clusters and supply chains.  
- Focus on microcontrollers, secure elements, automotive chips, and identity silicon.

6.2 Build a Pan‑European RISC‑V Ecosystem

- Invest in toolchains, verification frameworks, and open IP libraries.  
- Support academic–industrial collaboration.  
- Develop reference designs for sovereign microcontrollers and RoT chips.

6.3 Standardize Hardware‑Rooted Identity

- Define EU‑wide identity primitives for secure hardware.  
- Integrate identity into RISC‑V extensions and firmware.  
- Ensure compatibility with EU digital identity and cybersecurity frameworks.


7. Policy Recommendations

- Expand legacy‑node manufacturing capacity under the European Chips Act.  
- Fund RISC‑V research, verification, and open hardware development.  
- Establish EU‑level governance for RISC‑V profiles and extensions.  
- Create procurement guarantees for EU‑fabricated chips.  
- Support long‑term industrial partnerships across member states.


8. Conclusion

Europe cannot close the leading‑edge semiconductor gap in the short term, but it can achieve meaningful silicon sovereignty by focusing on legacy‑node manufacturing and open RISC‑V architectures. This strategy is realistic, economically viable, and aligned with Europe’s industrial strengths. It reduces platform dependency, strengthens critical infrastructure security, and provides a foundation for long‑term technological autonomy. By combining legacy‑node fabs with a coherent RISC‑V ecosystem and hardware‑rooted identity, the EU can build a resilient and sovereign semiconductor base without relying on leading‑edge nodes.

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