Toward a Substrate‑Neutral Theory of Thought
Continuity as a Minimal Organizational Condition
The present document provides a preliminary outline of a possible framework for describing cognitive‑like organization without reliance on assumptions regarding the physical substrate in which such organization occurs. The objective is limited to identifying a structural condition that may be relevant for the analysis of systems that exhibit persistence of internal organization over time. No claims are made regarding the completeness, necessity, or sufficiency of the proposed condition.
The initial observation motivating this outline is that certain systems display retention of identifiable internal relations despite ongoing variation in their components or external circumstances. Instances of this phenomenon have been reported in multiple domains, although the examples are not intended to imply comparability across those domains. The observation is included only to indicate that the phenomenon of organizational persistence is not restricted to a single class of systems.
For the purposes of this outline, the term “thought” is employed in a restricted, structural sense. It refers to the maintenance of organized internal relations under conditions in which such relations might otherwise be expected to degrade. This usage is not intended to imply subjective experience, intentionality, or any psychological property. It is used solely as a descriptive label for a specific form of structural continuity.
A minimal formulation of the proposed condition is provided below:
A system may be described as exhibiting thought‑like organization, in this restricted sense, to the extent that it maintains coherent internal structure while undergoing change.
This formulation does not specify mechanisms, substrates, or functional outcomes. It identifies only a general condition that appears relevant for systems that retain a stable internal configuration across time. The formulation is intentionally broad to avoid assumptions regarding implementation details.
If cognition is approached through this structural criterion, the distinction between cognitive and non‑cognitive systems becomes dependent on dynamical behavior rather than material composition. The relevant inquiry concerns the circumstances under which structural persistence is observed and the extent to which such persistence can be operationally defined.
The perspective outlined here does not address questions related to consciousness, subjective experience, or the equivalence of biological and artificial systems. It does not assert that continuity is a sufficient condition for cognition. It suggests only that continuity may constitute a useful analytical variable for examining systems that maintain internal organization despite variation in internal or external conditions.
A concise restatement is provided for reference:
A system can be described as cognitive, in this limited structural sense, if it remains organized while its internal or external conditions vary.
Further work would be required to determine whether this condition can be formalized, whether it can be measured in a consistent manner, and whether it provides explanatory value relative to existing theoretical approaches.